Is human freewill necessary for humans to be morally responsible for their acts?

[SCL] Moral responsibility and culpability is nothing to do with freewill whether this exists or not. A moral agent is culpable for an action if that action is largely determined by their character, nature or habits, as opposed to some external constraint or threat (whether physical or psychological) or some irreformable and incurable pathology or some transient aberration, as might occur as a result of high fever or unintentional intoxication. 

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is potentially correctable by means of training or education (or whatever other just means) then they are culpable and should attract such training or education, which may involve punishment. Punishment, however, should never be understood in terms of retribution or vengeance. It never achieves any good to hurt someone just for the sake of harming them.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is not susceptible to correction, then they are not culpable. If the action or behaviour is liable to recur and is of a sufficient nuisance, then they should have their freedom curtailed so as to prevent them re-offending. This constraint should not have any penitential character.

[MC] Despite the fact that I agree with you on the importance of character with regards to moral responsibility I think that once a certain level of maturity has been reached, a person is ultimately responsible for their own character. If they choose to indulge bad habits and solidify a bad character, that is an act of free will, and that is what makes them morally culpable.

[SCL] I agree unless you mean that you are sure that there is such a thing as freewill in a naïve sense of “could have done otherwise” and that “choice” implies the exercise of such “freewill”. A person is clearly responsible for their actions because they do them! One doesn't need to be exercising a naïve freewill to be responsible.

[MC] There is a difference between the type of responsibility you're describing and the moral responsibility you were discussing. If a baby picks up a gun and shoots a person, the baby is responsible in the sense that the baby performed the action – thus fitting your definition of responsibility – but the baby is clearly not morally culpable.

[SCL] Why is the baby “clearly” not morally responsible? How come that they picked up the gun and shot someone? We don’t have the full story here. Perhaps the baby was rather advanced in its mental development! Of course if the baby had no idea of what a gun is or what death is and that it could kill someone by shooting them, then my criterion for culpability is not satisfied: the act was then no more than an unfortunate misunderstanding or accident and nothing to do with the agent’s character.

[MC] My definition of the relationship of moral responsibility and free will includes, but is not limited to, the naïve definition you provide. Yes, a person is morally responsible if they could have done otherwise – provided that they also could have known otherwise than they did. A person who does wrong from ignorance is not morally culpable, even though they were responsible for the action.

[SCL] Indeed: but I’d say that this is because the act was not characteristic. Given that they were not cognoscente of its implications they did not envisage or intend them, hence these objective implications cannot be used to evaluate the subjective ethical character of their actions.

[MC] A person who does wrong despite the fact that they could reasonably be supposed to have known better is morally responsible for their actions, either because they deliberately did what they knew to be wrong (an exercise of free will against their moral responsibility) or because they failed to take positive action to remedy their lack of knowledge or previously corrupted character (a failure to exercise free will to discover and/or abide by your moral duties). Either way, free will is of paramount importance.

[SCL] No. What is of paramount importance is their character. I invoke Occam’s Rasor here. All of what you say can be accounted for in terms of whether the act flowed from their own personality and habitual virtues and vices or not. There is absolutely no need to invoke another issue: “freewill”. If some outcome was not envisaged in the act then this outcome played no part in the deliberative process which gave rise to the act. If I do not know that pressing the green button causes someone to be electrocuted to death then my pressing the green button for some other reason (even simply to amuse myself) is not an act of murder. Of course, we agree, that recklessness is itself a seriously immoral characteristic; but it is never clear what precautions one should take or research undertake in order to avoid the just charge of recklessness.

[SCL] Given that an agent did in fact do what they did, and given that this fact is determined by their experience and character and given that their character is itself determined by their experience, nurture and genetic inheritance, how could they have done other than what in fact they did do?

[SCL] It would seem that this is only possible if one invokes “randomness”. This produces two problems. First, a random act cannot possibly be culpable. Second, it is not clear what “random” means, and it may be that nothing can in fact be random! Invoking a non-material soul or spirit changes nothing. The argument repeats in the same way. If I am wrong in my analysis, please show me how. I would be truly indebted to you.

[MC] So, you're a determinist. Makes sense, I suppose.

[SCL] I am not a determinist in the sense that I wish to eliminate the notion of “freewill” from the discussion. In fact I don’t think that strict causality implies physical determinism in any naïve sense (because of “The Butterfly Effect”) any more that freewill is dependent on “could have done otherwise”.

[MC] You can't possibly believe that free will would have anything to do with moral responsibility, because for you free will as such cannot exist. It is at best a questionably-grounded construction other people use to assign responsibility for acts, and at worst a total illusion.

[SCL] Not really. As far as I can see “freewill” as you understand it is an superfluous hypothesis: that is all. I used to think that it was necessary and used this as an argument to justify believing in “naïve freewill”. Then I thought about the whole issue more carefully and concluded that I had been wrong. It seems to me that one only need believe in “naïve freewill” if one wishes to justify retribution and vengeance. As a Platonist, I have no desire to justify such things: my conclusion that “naïve freewill” is spurious follows.

[MC] I agree that “ a random act cannot possibly be culpable.” I am unclear about “it is not clear what ‘random’ means, and it may be that nothing can in fact be random!”. However, even stipulating that I agreed with your objection to an unclear definition, your prefatory sentence still seems staggeringly wrong.

[MC] An agent does, in fact, do what they do – that's tautologous – and it is true that the action proceeds from their experience and character; however, you're slipping in a different use of the word “determined” here. I grant that the motivation for any non-random act I perform may be found somewhere in my experience or in my character (or both). Therefore, those things together determine the range of options which I possess; but I still have a choice of options within that range. And though my experience and character may predispose me toward one of the options, my choice is not thereby determined.

[SCL] How do you know this? What, then, does determine or cause or elicit your action?

[MC] Do you see? We are taught, and fed, and observe, and practice – and so learn – a wide variety of moral stances and positions, correct?

[SCL] I’m not sure of your meaning here, but I suppose that I agree with you.

[MC] Then I fail to see how you can hold that any response of a competent moral agent can possibly be determined in the sense that the agent could not have done otherwise.

[SCL] Similarly, I fail to see how I could hold anything otherwise. The issue here is not about human freewill so much as the occurrence of any event. It would seem that either an account can be made of the event such that one comes to understand how and why this event occurred rather than any other that might seem to be possible before one understood the situation and lawful processes involved; or else no such account can be made. In the first case one has to conclude that the event was caused – if not, strictly speaking “determined” – by the relevant circumstances and lawful processes and “could not have been otherwise”, that is: it was not arbitrary, but coherent. In the second case one has to conclude that the event was random, arbitrary, uncaused and “could definitely have been otherwise”! However, you have agreed that – in the case of human acts – this second possibility is incompatible with culpability; hence it follows that culpability is only a coherent concept in connection with events (and human acts are certainly “events”) which are causal and so “could not have been otherwise”.

[MC] An example. The man who sees a rough-sleeper on the street and gives him five pounds' worth of charity entertains doubts about how they will spend the money, and feels guilty wondering whether they will just spend it on drink and worsen their situation. The man who sees a rough-sleeper on the street and does nothing entertains doubts about whether this might not have been an “honest” down-and-out who would have used the money for food, and feels guilty wondering whether he has just passed up the opportunity to do good by someone else. Both men experienced the same range of options. Perhaps they were predisposed to the choice they made; but the mere fact that they experienced the discomfort of a moral dilemma is evidence that the options they discarded were still live to them. They could have done other than they did.

[SCL] This is a mere assertion. There is no reason to think that it is true. I grant that when one makes a choice in such a situation it “feels” as if “one could have done otherwise”, but all that this means in practice is that there was a choice to be made; and that there was a conflict of uncertainty: not that one could have chosen differently.

‎[MC] I expect that you will attempt to invoke some sort of “complete picture” argument, whereby you argue that the choice of any agent is really determined, and the phenomenon I have discussed above is merely evidence of the complexity of human experiences and characters.

[SCL] Indeed: you haven't taken into account the complete picture. Any specific act is itself caused by their character, their past experiences and by the immediate situation in which they found themselves. It was these things which led them to do what they did, and they could not have done otherwise.”

[MC] But consider human nature. We very often do things differently in similar situations. I have been both men in the above situations, for example – I have both given and failed to give charity. So how can you say which is my dominant response, since I have done both and so clearly could do otherwise?
[SCL] But are the situations exactly the same in all the important factors? Did you have the same emotional mood, and were you in the same financial situation? Did the bum’s appearance inspire equal sympathy in you, or more or less? Were there people near you whom you would care to impress through an act of charity? Was the bum standing close to a liquor store? Had someone been kind or cruel to you recently? Had you heard a sermon on “the Good Samaritan” recently? Had you read an article about the foolishness of giving money to rough sleepers, recently?

[MC] Well, of course the factors won’t all be the same. The likelihood of even the major factors being the same is astronomical; and when you taken into account the minor factors, the chances become so long as to be practically impossible.

[SCL] Well, there you are, then! Different situations lead to different responses; but if you ever ran into a situation that was the same in all the relevant particulars, you couldn't do otherwise than you had done before – barring some change in your character or experience, of course; which would be inevitable, given that the second time was subsequent to the first and so your previous experience relevant to the second event is definitely different to that which was relevant to the first event.

[MC] Very convenient. Since those people would likely never run into exactly the same situation again, you are free to claim that if they respond differently in a similar situation in future, there is some controlling difference, either in an overlooked situational factor or in the modified characters or experiences of those people. So, if I gave money to a bum, and then had a bad experience with bums, the next one I meet and don't give money to, you would explain by saying…
[SCL] …that your new experience was involved in and contributed to your revised judgement.

[MC] There’s a difference between determined and informed. I can still choose to go against my instinctive desire to not give money to this rough-sleeper based on my bad past experience, can’t I? How is that not an exercise of free will?
[SCL] Such a desire would have to be motivated by some event from your past, or some moral code embedded in your character, wouldn't it? Otherwise, it's causeless!

[MC] Sure.
[SCL] You see, then: your moral acts can be accounted for in terms of your experience and character and there is no need to postulate that “you could have done otherwise.”

[MC] But this doesn’t mean thay are determined! Both choices are a part of my moral fabric. That I am inclined toward one or the other at any given point does not mean that both choices are not still available to me. The choice does not have to random to be free, nor do the alternatives have to be perfectly equal in probability. All that matters is that I make a selection from the range available to me, recognizing that of course there is a range available to me.

[SCL] You are now invoking a thing called “freedom” which seems to have all the characteristics of “random” but which you wish, nevertheless, to distinguish from “random”. Moreover you are referring to “probability” which only signifies something in the context of a random variable. In any case, it is not clear what “random means” or that anything is truly random.

[MC] Well, if you admit that you do not know what “random” means, perhaps this allows one to believe that some things which seem “random” are actually significant somhow – and that this justifies calling them “free” rather than simply “random”.

[SCL] Perhaps – but I’d require you to give an account of this; not just assert it as a matter of “blind irrational faith”; and then, it would seem plausible that any such account would render “free” part-and-parcel of the general account of how an an event came to happen. Once more, “free” acts would be accountable in terms of character and experience.

[SCL] Moreover, any choice which you actualize is determined by a host of factors, many of which you might not even be aware of.

[MC] Can you give me an account of which factors would incline me certain ways and why? I mean, it's your thesis that this must be the case. With one neat sentence, you’ve said that you can in principle explain every single thing anyone does. Let’s see you actually do that in practice!

[SCL] I don't have all the necessary information to predict your actions. Of course not! This is part of the difference of an event being “accountable”, “inevitable” and “caused” on the one hand and “determined” and “predictable” on the other.

[MC] Then you can’t prove I don’t have free will!
[SCL] It isn’t my business to do so! I am only intent on showing you that you have no need to account for “freewill”, “moral responsibility” or “culpability” in terms of “could have done otherwise.”

[MC] I have the experience of choosing.
[SCL] Indeed, and so do I; but it is a mistake to interpret this experience in terms of thinking that “you could have done otherwise.” In fact, your decisions are accountable in terms of genetics, mood, character and experience – past and present.

[MC] Let's set aside genes for the moment. I have, in the past, put myself into situations that changed my experiential data, or have deliberately put myself into situations knowing that a change in my character was likely to result. That's an exercise of free will, which neatly incorporates and supersedes your whole outlook.
[SCL] Such a choice would have to be motivated by...

[MC] …previous genetics, experiences, or character. I know! I know! If I pull your string, will you say something else?

[SCL] What would motivate me to do so? It seems to me that I have a surprisingly complete and coherent account of all the experience which you want me to explain. If you could show me an inconsistency or an incompleteness in my account, I would be very grateful; but until you do, I cannot conceive of any reason to deviate from my script – especially in terms of the deviation which you seem to favour as it appears to be incoherent and to explain nothing!

[MC] OK, here is a puzzle for you to chew on:

[MC] Let's say, just for the sake of argument, that my decisions are completely determined by my genetics and my experiences and my character combined. Therefore, none of my decisions is truly free, and so on my definition I am not morally responsible for them.

[SCL] On my account of things, you may very well be responsible for your acts: if your character is reformable – which fact you have not reported.
 

[MC] My genes are entirely a result of a random combination of genes from my parents. My character and experience partly comes from them – they are certainly the dominant figures – but also from a host of others, and even from the arrangement of things in the world. So these people and things exhaustively explain my behaviour, and therefore, they host the moral responsibility for my actions.

[SCL] That is a logical non-sequetor. I have said that culpabiliy arises when (1) an act flowslargely from the nature of the actor and (2) if that nature is susceptible to reformation.

[MC] But these people also got their genetics, characters, and experiences from elsewhere. So none of their decisions on how to raise me was a free one, either...and the genetics passed down to them were totally random, from a limited set of options.

[SCL] On your account of things, yes; but not on mine!

[MC] So the ultimate responsibility for my behaviour must be passed back to the explanations of the genetics, characters, and experiences of those who affected those who affected me. But none of those people can ultimately be held responsible either, for the same reason. In fact, it seems as though no human being can be ultimately responsible for his or her moral behaviour, or for the behaviour of any other person.

[SCL] On your account of things, yes; but not on mine!

[MC] The question, then: WHO OR WHAT IS?

[MC] You have five options, as far as I can see:

[MC] 1) Claim that nothing is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] No!
 

[MC] 2) Claim that Nature is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] No!
 

[MC] 3) Claim that God is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] Yes – but not as you mean it!
 

[MC] 4) Claim that there is an error in my definition of moral responsibility.

[SCL] Yes, as I have been doing consistently all along!
 

[MC] 5) Admit defeat.  

[SCL] Never!

[MC] I assume you will choose the fourth. Selecting the first would render your whole post moot. Selecting the second would be tantamount to admitting that assignment of moral responsibility is based on sheer chance. Selecting the third would be tantamount to holding God responsible for the sins of all of humanity. And since you clearly don't agree with my view that moral responsibility is tied to free will, in a choice between the only remaining options of #4 and #5, you must pick the former.

[SCL] This is an example of excellent logical reasoning!

[MC] Now, then. WHY?

[SCL] I hope that this is clear from what I have said above. To reiterate:

[SCL] Moral responsibility and culpability is nothing to do with freewill whether this exists or not. A moral agent is culpable for an action if that action is largely determined by their character, nature or habits, as opposed to some external constraint or threat (whether physical or psychological) or some irreformable and incurable pathology or some transient aberration, as might occur as a result of high fever or unintentional intoxication. 

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is potentially correctable by means of training or education (or whatever other just means) then they are culpable and should attract such training or education, which may involve punishment. Punishment, however, should never be understood in terms of retribution or vengeance. It never achieves any good to hurt someone just for the sake of harming them.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is not susceptible to correction, then they are not culpable. If the action or behaviour is liable to recur and is of a sufficient nuisance, then they should have their freedom curtailed so as to prevent them re-offending. This constraint should not have any penitential character.

[SCL] As far as I can see “freewill” as you understand it is an superfluous hypothesis: that is all. I used to think that it was necessary and used this as an argument to justify believing in “naïve freewill”. Then I thought about the whole issue more carefully and concluded that I had been wrong. It seems to me that one only need believe in “naïve freewill” if one wishes to justify retribution and vengeance. As a Platonist, I have no desire to justify such things: my conclusion that “naïve freewill” is spurious follows.

[SCL] The issue here is not about human freewill so much as the occurrence of any event. It would seem that either an account can be made of the event such that one comes to understand how and why this event occurred rather than any other that might seem to be possible before one understood the situation and lawful processes involved; or else no such account can be made. In the first case one has to conclude that the event was caused – if not, strictly speaking “determined” – by the relevant circumstances and lawful processes and “could not have been otherwise”, that is: it was not arbitrary, but coherent. In the second case one has to conclude that the event was random, arbitrary, uncaused and “could definitely have been otherwise”! However, you have agreed that – in the case of human acts – this second possibility is incompatible with culpability; hence it follows that culpability is only a coherent concept in connection with events (and human acts are certainly “events”) which are causal and so “could not have been otherwise”.

The attitude of Christ and His Apostles to Marriage and Family

Jesus was not at all keen on the family. He warns that family loyalty competes with loyalty to the Kingdom;[1] that His followers must expect to experience hostility from even their closest relatives;[2] and that they may well have to abandon their kin altogether.[3]


Jesus asserts that the true household is not based on ties of blood or romantic attachment; but on a shared acceptance of Gospel values.[4] If such an acceptance is characteristic of a particular family, well and good; but there is nothing about the domestic unit, as such, which makes it apt to substantiate Christian values. The Kingdom is meant to grow by the preaching of the Gospel and by adults being converted towards justice;[5] not by the procreation and indoctrination of children.[6] In any case, Jesus insists that marriage and the family are things of mortality, and that after the resurrection they will cease to exist.[7]

Christ not only took a stand against the whole tradition of the old covenant, according to which marriage and procreation were religiously privileged, as we have said. But in a certain sense He expressed Himself even in opposition to that beginning to which He Himself had appealed. [John Paul II “Allocution” (March 31st 1982)]

The Apostle Paul has a somewhat more positive view of marriage and the family. He expects family members to provide for impoverished relatives, rather then relying on the largess of the Church.[8] He tells children to obey their parents and fathers to be moderate in disciplining their progeny,[9] and in the same passage exhorts slaves to obey their masters. While Paul is convinced that it is much better for men not to have any physical relations with women, and presents his own celibate lifestyle as an example to all;[10] he nevertheless tolerates marriage as a second best arrangement for those incapable of sexual continence.[11] In a more generous spirited moment, Paul writes of Christian marriage as an icon of the relationship of Christ with the Church.[12]


The Epistle to the Hebrews insists that marriage is honourable and its bed is clean,[13] while emphasising that Christians must not adopt an insular domestic outlook: and enjoining the duties of maintaining fellowship with the wider Church community and of showing hospitality to strangers. Neither Jesus nor any of his Apostles ever suggests that either marriage or the family is particularly significant in the divine scheme of things. They never say that it is the building block of secular society, still less of the Church. They never refer to the family as “the domestic church”. Indeed, this is an altogether modern invention.[14] Although Augustine[15] twice makes use of the idea and Chrysostum[16] once, they suggest more that the secular institution of the family can, with some effort, be Christened, than that it is constitutive of the Church.

1. Mat 8:21-22. Lk 9:59-62; 14:16-26.

2. Mat 10:17-22, 34-37. Mk 13:11-13. Lk 12:51-53.

3. Mat 19:27-29. Mk 10:28-30. Lk 18:28-30.

4. Mat 12:46-50. Mk 3:21-35. Lk 8:19-21.

5. Mat 4:17, 10:7. Mk 1:38; 3:14; 16:15. Lk 4:18, 43; 9:2.

6. Jn 1:12-13.

7. Mat 22:29-30 Mk 12:24- 25 Lk 20:34-36. Pope John Paul II deduces from this fact the conclusion that the theological significance of gender cannot be determined in terms of marriage and reproduction.


8. 1Tim 5:4-8, 16.

9. Eph 6:1-9 Col 3:20-4:1.

10. 1Cor 7:1-9, quoted on page 26.

11. 1Cor 7:10-39.


12. Eph 5:21-33. Many modern scholars dispute that Paul wrote Ephesians. The converse image (where the union of Christ and the Church is presented as a marriage) is found in the Apocalypse. [Apoc 19:7-9]

13. Heb 13:4.


14. Vatican II “Lumen Gentium” #11 (1964) & John Paul II “Famularis Consortio” #21 (1981)

15. Augustine “The Good of Widowhood” #29 & “Epistle 188, to The Lady Juliana” #3.

16. Chrysostom “Second Homily on Genesis” #13.

Two paths to holiness

The soul intent on attaining God must aspire to holiness, which is itself best understood as the deepest form of psychological health. In this endeavour, they have a choice to make. This is between the ascetical path and the aesthetical path. Both feature prominently in Catholic culture.
The first path entails setting aside all secondary goods (and so the beauty to be found in the material world) and choosing to live a life of austerity; focussing solely on the one truly desirable object: God. This path is represented in the austerity of a Cistercian Abbey or Carthusian Chatreuse.

The second path entails embracing secondary goods (and so the beauty which is to be found in the material world) as an intimation of God: the one truly beautiful object of desire. This path is represented in the vibrancy of a Gothic Cathedral or Byzantine Basilica.

The Ascetic Way
The advantage of the first path (which Plato terms the "Philosophical”) is that it is simple to understand. The soul’s motive for taking this way is a concern that it might be distracted from its true end and goal by lesser and passing beauties. It is, perhaps, the easier of the two paths – for those who have the character to stomach it. It is like a goat track leading straight up a mountainside to the summit. If one follows this path one will not readily become lost; but it requires courage.[1]

The fact that Christ tells us that our earthly journey will be hard if we faithfully follow Him suggests that one should seek to mitigate this difficulty as far as possible. Too often life in the world is a “vale of tears”, so the ascetic deems it sensible to avoid worldly entanglements; even to the extent of renouncing many things and activities which are manifestly wholesome in themselves and are deemed good in Scripture.

The ascetic is largely free of the cares and systematic suffering which are characteristic of mundane life; so they must impose extrinsic penance upon themselves, else the way they have chosen will rapidly become a self-indulgent escape from reality. The first such penance is, of course, the very renunciation of worldly pleasure which lies at the heart of their lifestyle. The second is (for those ascetics who live in community) the trials of a conventual life, from which there is no escape. The third is whatever additional regime of fasting and discipline they and their spiritual director deem appropriate. The ascetic must eschew genital sexuality as much as every other unnecessary species of sensory pleasure. Not because they think it bad in itself; but only because they know it to be, for them, a distraction from the erotic pursuit of God. The ascetic does not have to reject friendship, for one ascetic can be of great help to another in their common ascent of the straight way to the spiritual summit they jointly aspire to; and the fellowship of friends of God is hardly any distraction from the friendship of God itself. However, in the most extreme form of asceticism, the hermit avoids all but unavoidable interactions with any other soul.

 The danger of the ascetic way is that it can lead to an aridity and harshness of soul; where all that is good in the world is discounted as valueless or, worse, wicked and nothing more than a source of temptation. It can also lead to a spiritual conceit which despises all those who have not themselves adopted the ascetic path. The ascetic can easily be corrupted into the Puritan; or even the Gnostic, who accounts God’s physical Creation as basically evil.

The Aesthetic Way
The advantage of the second path is that it is more gentle and compatible with the inclinations of the human heart. It offers more pleasure and comfort along the way – but also more pain and suffering. The soul’s motive for taking this path is a delight in the goodness of God’s creation and a recognition of the revelation of the Divine which is to be found therein. This way is like a gentle winding path up a mountain that leads to the summit, but which takes in a number of lesser beauty spots on the way. If one follows this path one will not readily become disheartened; but it requires temperance.[3]

The fact that Christ tells us that our earthly journey will be hard if we faithfully follow Him, doesn’t mean that we must reject the mundane pleasures which are readily available to us in God’s wondrous creation. Too often life in the world is a “vale of tears”, so the aesthete deems it not sensible to renounce those things and activities which are an immediate comfort to the soul, manifestly wholesome, and deemed good in Scripture. The aesthete finds due penance in their daily life; in their social interactions, family involvements, relationships with friends and the demands of their profession, business or work. For many people this is ample challenge; but others can benefit from the discipline of extrinsic penance.

The danger of the aesthetic way is that it can lead to self-indulgence: a confusion of the limited value of the immediate gratification of the mind and body with the infinite value of the eventual gratification which will result from union with God. The aesthete can easily be corrupted into the Hedonist or even the Materialist, who accounts as worthwhile only what they can see, hear, taste, smell and feel.

Our Lord’s example

It is a moot point as to which way of holiness Jesus’ human life exemplifies. It seems as if Jesus was intent on presenting both options to us in His earthly life; so as to validate both and indicate that either is good and proper. On the one hand Our Lord was not married, moreover we are told that His ministry was prefaced by an extended fast, and that He regularly desired to “get away from the crowds” in order to devote Himself to prayer. These facts are all characteristic of the Ascetic way. On the other hand, Jesus was deeply attached to “the disciple whom He loved”, Lazarus4 and to Martha and Mary the two sisters of Lazarus. Moreover, He accepted the caress of Mary of Magdala, associated Himself with sinners and was accused of revelry by His detractors.[3] These facts are all characteristic of the Aesthetic way.

1. Courage is the virtue that distinguishes between what is truly to be feared and that which only seems to be fearsome. It allows the agent to act with simplicity, integrity and whole-heartedness.

2. Temperance is the virtue which moderates and organises the emotions, appetites and desires so that they are coordinated and harmonised towards the obtaining of what is truly good for the agent.

3. Mat 9:10-13; 11:19.

God and the Natural Law: "having one's cake and eating it"

I have been trying to explain to a FaceBook friend how one can "have it both ways", regarding Plato's Ethryphro Dilemma.

1. Ethics is not imposed on moral agents extrinsically by any kind of Divine whimsy. The moral Law is not "positive" or "constructed" or "decreed" or anything of the kind. Hence: "what the heavens approve of what is pious", which is the first option that Socrates proffers Ethryphro.

2. Ethics is an externalisation of what is actually and objectively beneficial to those moral agents to which it applies. It flows from and is determined by the nature of those moral agents. It is entirely intrinsic to their nature. Hence an understanding of their nature will give rise to a codification of "the Natural Law" by which they ought to operate if they are to "live long and prosper".

3. The basis of all this is the concept of harmony, cooperation and friendship, both in society and in the soul. The first is social justice, the second is personal justice - or holiness. Both are species of health: the first social and the second psychological and/or physiological. See Plato's "Republic" for a full exposition of this.

4. One of the fundamental characteristics of God is Justice - interior harmony. The fact of God's Immortality and Eternal Robustness implies that God is entirely harmonious and devoid of interior conflict. Hence at this most abstract level the Divine Nature is identical with "The Natural Law" in as far as the Divine Nature generates the Natural Law as a corollary of its self. The Natural Law is an image of the original that is Justice.

5. So far as the details of the Natural Law are concerned, these result from the interplay of the Idea of "Justice" with the particularities of the make-up or constitution or nature of the moral agent to which it is applied. Given that God has created certain kinds of moral agent, with particular characteristics (for whatever reason) then to this extent the Natural Law is "positive" and "decreed" - but only indirectly, in as far as it is true that the details of constitution of the moral agents are "positive" and "decreed" rather than of necessity. Hence: "what is pious is what the heavens approve of", which is the second option that Socrates proffers Ethryphro.

Is and Ought and Life

I have written often on the “is/ought dichotomy” or “Hume’s Dilemma” (look these up on Wikkipedia, if you like) but here goes again. Ayn Rand claimed to have solved this long-standing philosophical problem, but most other thinkers have concluded that she did not do so.

As a Plotonist, I think that for there to be an “ought” there must be a purpose or end in view. “Ought” is always about what is good to do and what is good to do is good to do because it obtains some “good” or “valuable commodity” or “beneficial/favourable effect”. Now, it would seem that without a choice there cannot be an end and so there can be no good; because what is good or valuable is always good in as far as it is valuable for some objective. Technically, “good” is teleological: in other words “good is utility”.

The problem with this position is that it gives no account of how a choice might be made. Without such an account it degrades into Existentialism, in which value is understood as entirely subjective and somehow created by the individual person: who is themselves understood as valueless except by virtue of some kind of choice to be valuable. This position is incoherent, as what is of itself of no value (in this case the human person) cannot create value by a mere act of whimsy.

The fact that rats are of utility to the bubonic plague bacterium in spreading it to other hosts does not make rats valuable as such. In fact, from a human perspective, it makes rats un-valuable and the project of their extermination a desirable good. Conversely, from the rat perspective, human ignorance about their role in the epidemiology of the Black Death is a desirable end – though how this great “good” might be achievable by the rat commonality is unclear.

I think that the solution to the is/ought dichotomy is something along the lines of Ayn Rand’s proposal, but that one needs to augment her position somewhat. The first thing to realise is that “ought” and “goal” and “good” and “utility” all arise from the nature of Life. These words only have application in the context of a living being. Only a living being can have any “goal” and nothing can possibly be “good for” any other thing – unless that other thing is alive. While one might say that a carefully controlled humidity and temperature are “good for” the preservation of ancient manuscripts, this is only an analagous use of the term – and it would not arise except in the context that living beings had first constructed those manuscripts and that other living beings were interested in their preservation.

This first realisation makes one focus on the fact that “ought” is not a word of general applicability, but only of applicability within the context of life. This is not an additional axiom, it is simply a realisation of the underlying significance of the concept. This is basically the realisation which Ayn Rand came to see and then promoted as the answer to Hume’s Dilemma. She argued that “ought” could always be reduced to a choice to live; and to live in accordance with the nature that one had, making full use of one’s capabilities so as to best secure, facilitate, establish and fortify one’s life.

The second thing to realise is what life is. Without this realisation, Ayn Rand’s solution to Hume’s Dilemma can be deconstructed along the lines: “But why should any living agent chose to live?” I propose that: “Life is continuance and stability of form in and by virtue of and out of flux.”

This is relevant to Hume’s dilemma in an almost trivial way. Just as “ought” originates from life, so if one chooses to do what one “ought not” then one will not live. The only basic choice, therefore, is between life and death. It is true, in an uninteresting way, that this choice is real and that it is not motivated by anything other than the outcome in question; but that is exactly the point! If one chooses life one lives, if one chooses death one dies. Those that chose death and die have no existence, whereas those that chose life and live do have existence. This is the basic fact of the matter and is entirely objective and unavoidable.

As to why one ought to chose life: that is easy – to do so is coherent: logically consistent. Life’s constitutional business is to survive: that is what life is all about. Survival is definitional of life in the way that no other of its supposed/proposed characteristics are. For life to chose death is incoherent and self-contradictory and results in life ceasing to be itself. All living beings which chose death cease to be living beings, so the only choice possible for a living being is the choice of life: in fact death is not a choice for a living being!

The deeper question: “Why should a conscious living being wish to continue to live, especially if they are unhappy and believe themselves to have no prospect of joy?” remains, but I am not inclined to tackle this here and now.

How can God be Love?

The question as to how God can be "love" in any meaningful sense is one that has occupied my attention for a long time. The difficulty becomes apparent once one attempts a generic account of love along the lines of:

"Love is the desire, attraction or movement
of one object or agent (the lover)
for or towards
another object (the subject or beloved)
which is (rightly or wrongly) perceived or understood or believed or known
to be good, beneficial or useful for the lover."

This account of love is sufficiently broad to allow for all "rational love" ranging from "cows love grass" to "Plato loves Theaetetus". In particular, it allows for the love of a child of its parents.

However, this account does not allow for "irrational" love, such as the love of parents for children - and, arguably, sexual (as opposed to friendly erotic) love: for the objects of these attractions are not really even falsely perceived as beneficial to the lover and in fact are certainly not beneficial. The basis of such loves is the benefit of the species or life itself or "the selfish gene" - however you wish to put it - not the individual who loves.

Now the Divine Nature is entirely One and entirely self-adequate, so how can God be identified with love? Love requires a lover and a beloved: an agent and an object of desire. Moreover, desire requires a perceived benefit which is not actually possessed by the lover. On each of these grounds, it would seem that love is entirely foreign to the Divine Nature and in fact a characteristic of imperfection and contingency.

It seems to me that this objection should be answered in the following way. First by extending our account of love still further and second by a postulation regarding the Nature of the Divine Unity.

The extension of the account of love is as follows:

"Love is the
desire, attraction, movement,
POSSESSION OR SECURE ASSOCIATION OR INTEGRATION
of or with
one object or agent (the lover)
for or towards or with
another object (the subject or beloved)
which is (rightly or wrongly) perceived or understood or believed or known
to be good, beneficial or useful for the lover."

In the case of "possession or secure association or integration" love can be said to be "fulfilled" and is also known as "joy". As is remarked in Symposium, love can be understood as the lover's desire for completion and this indicates its terminus in secure association or integration with or possession of the beloved. In the sense of "love as joy" God's nature can be said to be love (and ecstatic erotic love, at that!) because God utterly and entirely possesses the only good that is good for God: namely the Divine Nature itself.

The postulation regarding the Divine Nature amounts to the Catholic dogma of the Trinity, which Mystery was celebrated yesterday in the Roman Church. This doctrine teaches that the One Divine Nature is substantiated by the love of three persons or hypostases which both underpin as foundations the single Nature which is their fellowship and common life and also each posses, motivate, comprehend and actuate that One Nature.

The joy or love that is characteristic of God cannot be "emotional" as human beings experience joy or love: for emotions are a function of mutability and passion, and these are entirely foreign to the Divine Nature. Rather, this joy or love is the love of which Diotima is recorded as saying that it is possible for a human soul to come to share in at the terminus of the process of enlightenment, when any true disciple of love can come to be a friend of God and to understand and contemplate what beauty, justice, wisdom and truth really are in themselves.

This leaves two further questions unanswered:

1. Why and how did/does God as Demiurge create the world?
2. Why and how did/does God as Redeemer justify and divinise the world?

Regarding the first: given that God is Necessary Being and immune to all constraint or impetus, it must be the case that once the Act of Creation is rightly understood it must be seen to be inevitable and necessary, without that inevitability of necessity implying a lack in the Divine Nature considered apart from the object of that Act. Moreover, if one is going to maintain the Judeo-Christian doctrine of "creation ex-nihil", so that the Cosmos is entirely distinct from the Divine Nature, which itself is unperturbed by the Act, this would seem to be impossible: for apart from the Cosmos it would seem that the Divine Nature must lack anything that of necessity belongs to it and if the Cosmos is truly autonomous (apart from the Act of Creation itself) and not conatural with God then it must be legitimate to consider God and the Cosmos apart from each other, with only the Creative Act relating them.

I think that it is impossible to give a definitive answer to this question; but I wish to propose what I consider to be a plausible speculation for your consideration.

If God is truly omniscient, then God necessarily knows every detail about every Cosmos that might coherently exist. I grant that this might be an infinity of infinities of knowledge, but what is this to God? The fact of this knowledge is not in any way a limitation on God: quite the opposite, of course! Now the question immediately arises: "What is the difference between God knowing every detail about a possible Cosmos and God giving creative reality to that Cosmos?" I, for one, cannot conceive of anything which could be added to such exhaustive Divine knowledge in order to "elevate" it to some more "substantial" reality. What could be "more real" than an exhaustive account in "the mind of God"?

If I am right that the Act of Creation is identical with God's inevitable and necessary exhaustive knowledge of every possible Cosmos, then the paradox of creation is resolved. God's knowledge of all that might be, contingently, is not in conflict with the Necessity of the Divine Being: rather, it is necessitated by that Being. Moreover, the attractive idea that the Act of Creation is somehow an exuberant and ecstatic overflowing of the Divine Nature is given a rational basis.

A major implication of this hypothesis is that God must be conceived of as having created a plurality of universes: in fact every possible coherent universe must "exist", if God is truly omniscient and omnipotent and if the Divine Act of Creation is identical with the Divine Act of Cognition. Hence "Multiverse Theory" (so beloved by atheistic theoretical physicists) would seem to be predicted by a rigorous analysis of Monotheism.

Regarding the second question (which amounts to "Why does God bother about and have concern for the welfare of created things) I suggest that this is a matter of coherence and harmony and so of justice. When God conceives of a Cosmos as coherent and possible, a major constraint is apparent: namely that the Cosmos being conceived is being conceived by an omnipotent and absolutely just conceiver. It is inconceivable that such a conceiver would conceive of a Cosmos which was futile or fundamentally unjust - at least in its final resolution. In other words, any Cosmos that God conceives of must inevitably reflect the Divine Nature and must in some sense have its teleos or purpose or end or resolution in God. It would not be possible for God to conceive of any other kind of Cosmos: it would be an affront to the Divine Nature and so is absurd. Any Cosmos that required some kind of extrinsic intervention to justify it would necessarily attract such intervention. Hence: God so loved the world, that He gave us his only-begotton Son; so that all who believe in Him would have everlasting Life.

Mercy and Justice

The word mercy does not simply mean “letting someone off a punishment which they deserve as a result of misbehaviour”. It also means kindness, generosity and benevolence. The “Good Samaritan” was, in this sense, merciful to the man who had been set upon by thieves and left for dead when he came to his aid. [Lk 10:37] When the Eastern Liturgies cry out over and over “Lord, have mercy!” they are not asking for forgiveness, but rather for Divine assistance.

So far as God is concerned, no created being actually deserves anything of its own right; so all of God’s actions towards creatures are essentially those of mercy not justice. However, it is only proportionate, right and proper that God does act towards creatures with mercy; for else they could not exist and the very act of creation would be made into an absurdity. So, in God justice and mercy do not conflict but are aspects of the same reality.

Moreover, it is also just of God to be merciful to the sinner in view of the fact that God foresees that in the future they will be a saint, if only God is presently merciful. Arguably, the same is true in the human context also. It is just to be merciful; where mercy means giving a culprit a chance to repent and change their ways. It is merciful to be just; where justice means imposing a penalty which is crafted to bring about penitence and reformation in the heart of the wrongdoer.